Mean field games (MFG) are dynamic games with infinitely many infinitesimal agents. In this context, we study the efficiency of Nash MFG equilibria: Namely, we compare the social cost of a MFG equilibrium with the minimal cost a global planner can achieve. We find a structure condition on the game under which there exists efficient MFG equilibria and, in case this condition is not fulfilled, quantify how inefficient MFG equilibria are.
Introduction
Mean field games (MFG) study Nash equilibria in differential games with infinitely many indistinguishable agents. In this note, we investigate the classical question of the efficiency for these Nash equilibria: we compare the social cost corresponding to a MFG equilibrium with the optimal social cost obtained by a global planner.
To fix the ideas and describe the model we have in mind, we start with a finite horizon differential game played by a large number of agents (say N ). Agent i P t1, . . . , N u controls her dynamics:
" dX i t " α i t dt`?2dB i t , t P r0, T s,
where T is the horizon, the pB i q are N independent Brownian motions and the px i 0 q are N i.i.d. random variables on R d , independent of the pB i q, with law m 0 . The control pα i q is chosen by agent i in order to minimize a cost of the form is the empirical measure of the players. We assume that dynamics and costs have a special structure: agent i controls directly her own drift and her running cost at time t depends on her position X i t , on her control α i t and on the empirical measure of all players m N Xt ; her terminal cost depends on her position X i T at the terminal time T and on the empirical measure m N X T at that time. Note that, under our assumptions, the agents have symmetric dynamics and costs functions.
The social cost associated with the N agents is the average of the J i :
The quantity C˚is our first main object of investigation. We interpret it as the social cost associated with a global planner.
Following [24] (see also [3, 4] and Lemma 2.2 below), and under suitable conditions stated below, the above problem for C˚has a minimum pm,αq and there exists a mapû such that pû,mq solves the forward-backward system while δL{δm and δĜ{δm are the derivatives of the maps m Ñ Lpx, α, mq and m ÑĜpmq, respectively, with respect to the measure variable m (see Section 2).
Decentralized setting. When there is no cooperation between the agents, one expects them to play a Nash equilibrium. The characterization of Nash equilibria (in memory strategy) is known in this setting [5, 18] and related to the Folk's Theorem (any feasible and individually rational payoff can be achieved as a Nash equilibrium). However, when the number N of agents is large and the agents are indistinguishable, it is not reasonable to ask all the agents to observe each other: the notion of memory strategy (or even of global feedback strategy) does not seem to make much sense. One would expect the agent to act instead by taking into account their own position and the distribution of the position of other agents: this is precisely what mean field games formalize.
Mean field games. Mean field games (MFG) model differential games with infinitely many indistinguishable players. They were introduced by Lasry and Lions [22, 23, 24] . At the same period, Huang, Caines and Malhamé discussed the same concept under the terminology of "Nash certainty equivalence principle" [13, 15] . The MFG system associated with the above control problem reads, in terms of PDEs,
In the above system, u " upt, xq is the value function of a typical player while m " mpt, xq describes the evolving probability density of all agents. Note that the drift´D p Hpx, Dupt, xqq in the equation for m corresponds to the optimal feedback of the agent. Heuristically, the pair pu, mq describes a Nash equilibrium in the infinite population problem.
The social cost associated with a MFG equilibrium pu, mq, which is the averaged cost of each player, can be defined as:
where α˚pt, xq "´D p Hpx, upt, xqq is the optimal feedback in the MFG. The quantity Cpu, mq is the second main object of investigation of this paper.
Comparison between the two problems. The difference between the two problems-the centralized optimal control of McKean-Vlasov dynamics and the MFG equililbria-has been often discussed in the literature: see, for instance, [3, 9, 8, 10, 14] . So far the attention has focussed on the difference in structure between the two systems of equations (namely, for our problem, (1.1) and (1.3)). Note that, in our specific setting, there is no real difference between (1.1) and (1.3): so one could expect that the two problems are very close in terms of social cost.
Comparison between C˚and Cpu, mq. In this paper, we plan to compare the social costs Cå nd Cpu, mq. Obviously one has C˚ď Cpu, mq. We want to understand a little better the case of equality and the size of the difference Cpu, mq´C˚.
This question has been often addressed in the classical game theory: a characterization of efficiency can be found for instance in [12] , which also proved that, generically, the Nash equilibria are not efficient. The problem became very popular under the name of "price of anarchy", introduced in [19] for noncooperative games in which agents share a common resource. We also refer for instance to [16, 17, 25, 26] and the references therein, in the framework of selfish routing games and congestion games. Related to our setting with infinitely many players, the recent paper [21] discusses the price of anarchy for static games with a large number of players.
This large literature is in sharp contrast with the literature on differential games, where efficiency has seldom been investigated, and only recently: [2] estimates the price of anarchy in some scalar linear-quadratic (LQ) differential games; Directly related to our work, [1] addresses the question of the inefficiency of MFG Nash equilibria by numerical simulations. This question is also discussed in [11] , in the settings of LQ MFG and of MFG on finite Markov chains.
Main results. The main topic of our paper is the estimate of the difference between C˚and Cpu, mq-in our set-up, the ratio C˚{Cpu, mq, generally used for the price of anarchy, does not seem to make much sense. To simplify a little the estimates, we work in the periodic setting (and therefore in the torus 
where α˚pt, xq "´D p Hpx, Dupt, xq, mptqq. The constants C ě 1 depends on the regularity of the data and C ε ě 1 depends also on ε. The presence of ε is technical and is related with the constraints at time t " 0 (where mp0q " m 0 ) and t " T (where upT, xq " Gpx, mpT qq). We are only able to obtain an upper bound for Cpu, mq´C˚under additional assumptions: First we assume that H has a separate form: H " H 0 px, pq´F px, mq; Second, we suppose that G (defined by (1.2)) andF (defined in a similar way) are convex (in which case the solution of the MFG system (1.1) is unique, see [24] ). Then, in Theorem 5.1, we show the upper bound:
px, y, mptqqmpt, xqdx
where the constant C depends on the regularity of H, F and m 0 . As δL{δm " δF {δm in the separate case, this lower bound is close to the upper bound given above (with a different exponent, though). We can conclude that, in this setting, the size of the quantity › ›´T Examples. To fix the ideas, we assume that the MFG system is separated: H " H 0 px, pqF px, mq and has zero terminal condition: G " 0. We explain in Section 6 through several examples, that our estimates roughly imply that MFG Nash equilibria are in general inefficient, at least unless the coupling has a very specific structure.
On the positive side, we prove the existence of MFG systems which are globally efficient, i.e., such that, for any initial condition pt 0 , m 0 q there exists a MFG equilibrium pu, mq starting from pt 0 , m 0 q with Cpu, mq " C˚: More precisely, we show in Theorem 3.4 that a MFG system is globally efficient if and only if
or, equivalently, if and only if one can write the coupling function F in the form
for some map F " Fpmq. Moreover, one can check (Example 6.1) that such a coupling function F genuinely depends on m unless F is affine. However, the above structure on F is seldom encountered in practice, and in general there exist (many) initial conditions for which there is no efficient MFG equilibria. This is the case for instance if F " F pmq does not depend on x or if F derives from a potential. In these two cases, the MFG system is globally efficient if and only if F is constant (Examples 6.2 and 6.3). Moreover, our bounds can be simplified in this setting: When F does not depend on x, the lower bound for a MFG equilibrium can be rewritten in term of the Holder constant of the map t Ñ F pmptqq:
where the supremum is taken over t 1 , t 2 P rε, T´εs. When F is potential (and thus, as explained in Example 6.3, F vanishes and thus is convex), the two inequalities can directly be expressed in function of F :
In the same way, one can show (Example 6.4) that the MFG equilibria associated with a coupling function of the form F px, mq "ˆT d φpx, yqmpdyq , for some smooth map φ :
cannot be globally efficient unless φ does not depend on y (and therefore F does not depend on m).
Extension and limits. Although we won't make it explicit, one can check that our results generalize to other MFG systems (for instance with local coupling functions or to ergodic MFG systems). However we leave several questions unanswered. First we do not know if the upper bound also holds without our additional assumption. Our technique of proof does not seem to give much result in full generality or requires very restrictive assumptions (see Remark 5.1). Second, our lower bound seems difficult to generalize to problems with more complex dynamics or for problems with bounded controls: Indeed our approach strongly relies on the fact that the minimization problem for C˚has regular solutions, and this requires some assumptions. Finally let us strongly underline that our estimates have little to do with the universal estimates obtained in the context of the "price of anarchy": Our bounds heavily depend on the regularity of the data and only show how the difference Cpu, mq´C˚is small or large in function of the specific quantities
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we explain our main notations, state our standing assumptions and characterize the minimizers for C˚in terms of equation (1.1). Section 3 states necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for a MFG equilibrium to be efficient. In Section 4 and 5, we quantify how far a MFG equilibrium is from efficiency: Section 5 gives a lower bound and Section 5 an upper bound. We conclude by Section 6 with the discussion on several examples.
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Assumptions and preliminary results

Notations and assumptions
Throughout the paper we work with maps which are all periodic in space, or, in other words, on the d´dimensional torus T d :" R d {Z d : this simplifying assumption allows us to ignore problems related to boundary issues or growth conditions of the data. We denote by PpT d q the set of Borel probability measures on T d , endowed with the Monge-Kantorovitch distance d 1 :
where the supremum is taken over all 1´Lipschitz continuous maps φ :
We will use the notion of derivative of a map U : PpT d q Ñ R as introduced in [6] . We say that U is C 1 if there exists a continuous map
The above relation defines the map δU δm only up to a constant. We always use the normalization conventionˆT
If u : T dˆr 0, T s Ñ R is a sufficiently smooth map, we denote by Dupx, tq and ∆upx, tq its spatial gradient and spatial Laplacian and by B t upx, tq its partial derivative with respect to the time variable.
Assumptions. The following assumptions are in force throughout the paper.
• The Lagrangian L " Lpx, α, mq : T dˆRdˆP pT d q Ñ R is of class C 2 with respect to all variables and satisfies
We also suppose thaťˇˇˇδ
We define the convex conjugate H of L as
t´p¨α´Lpx, α, mqu, and we assume that H is of class C 2 as well. Note that H also satisfies:
• The coupling function G : T dˆP pT d q Ñ R is globally Lipschitz continuous with space derivatives B x i G : T dˆP pT d q Ñ R also Lipschitz continuous. We also assume that the map G is C 2 with respect to m and that its derivatives
We will say below that a constant depends on the regularity of the data if it depends on the horizon T , dimension d, on the C 2 regularity of H, on the constant C in (2.8), on the bound on G and on the modulus of Lipschitz continuity of δG{δm and of δ 2 G{δm 2 .
It will be convenient to set
Let us compute, for later use, δ p G{δm:
This implies the claim in view of Convention (2.4).
An optimality condition
We now investigate optimality conditions for the problem, written in an unformal way as
under the constraint
We recall how to give a rigorous meaning to the following expression. We denote by Ept 0 q the set of time-dependent Borel measures pmptq,
and equation
holds in the sense of distribution. We also denote by E 2 pt 0 q the subset of pmptq, wptqq P Ept 0 q such that wptq is absolutely continuous with respect to mptq with a density dwptq dmptq satisfyinĝ
wptq dmptq pxqˇˇˇˇ2 mpdx, tqdt ă 8.
Then we define J on Ept 0 q by Jpm, wq :"
We now explain that minimizers of the functional J correspond to solutions of the MFG system. This remark was first pointed out in [24] and frequently used since then in different contexts.
Lemma 2.2. Under our standing assumptions, the above problem has at least one solution.
Moreover, for any solution pm,ŵq, there existsû such that the pair pû,mq is a classical solution to As it has been often pointed out (see [3, 9, 8, 10, 14] for instance), the above system does not correspond to a mean field game in general because of the extra term on the right-hand side of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation.
The proof of Lemma 2.11 is standard and has been described in [4] when H " H 0 px, pqF px, mq has a separate form. We only explain the main changes.
Proof. The existence of a solution can be established exactly as in [4] . Let now pm,ŵq be a minimum of J. For any pm, wq P E and λ P p0, 1q, we set m λ :" p1´λqm`λm, w λ :" p1´λqŵ`λw. We have by minimality of pm,ŵq:
By the convexity condition of L " Lpx, α, mq in (2.5), the map ps, zq Ñ Lpx, s{z, mqs on p0,`8qˆR d is convex for any fixed x, m. So we havê
So we can rewrite (2.13) as:
Lpx,ŵ m ,mqm˙´pĜpm λ pT qq´ĜpmpT.
Thus dividing by λ ą 0 and letting λ Ñ 0`we find, thanks to the regularity of L andĜ: We can then conclude exactly as in [4] that there existsû such that pû,mq is a classical solution to the MFG system (2.11) and thatŵ "´mD p Hpx, Dû,mptqq.
Efficiency of MFG equilibria
Let pt 0 , m 0 q P r0, T sˆPpT d q be an initial distribution and pu, mq be the solution of the MFG system
14)
The social cost associated with the equilibrium pu, mq is defined by Cpu, mq "ˆT where the infimum is taken over the pairs pm, αq such that
Although C˚depends on the initial position pt 0 , m 0 q, we will omit to write this dependence explicitly to simplify the expressions. We say that an equilibrium pu, mq, solution of the MFG system (3.14), is efficient if Cpu, mq " C˚.
We say that the MFG system (3.14) is globally efficient if, for any initial position pt 0 , m 0 q P r0, T sˆPpT d q, there exists an efficient MFG equilibrium with initial position pt 0 , m 0 q. As the double integral vanishes because of Convention (2.4), we get c 1 ptq " 0, and therefore, coming back to (3.17),
A necessary condition for efficiency
Equality upT, xq " vpT, xq`cpT q also implies by Lemma 2.1 that
Gpy, mpT qqmpT, yqdy`cpT q.
Integrating with respect to mpT, xqdx and using Convention (2.4), we obtain:
Gpy, mpT qqmpT, yqdy`cpT q, and thereforeˆT d δG δm py, mpT q, xqmpT, yqdy " 0 @x P T d .
Characterization of the global efficiency
Let us recall that we say that the MFG system (3.14) is globally efficient if, for any initial position pt 0 , m 0 q P r0, T sˆPpT d q, there exists an efficient MFG equilibrium with initial position pt 0 , m 0 q. In order to proceed and characterize global efficiency, we need to work in a special case: we assume that H has the separate form
Then L is also in a separate form:
where L 0 px, αq " sup p α¨p´H 0 px, pq is the convex conjugate of H 0 with respect to the last variable. In this case, the MFG system (3.14) becomes:
Note also that δL{δm reduces to δL δm py, α, x, mq " δF δm py, x, mq, where the right-hand side is independent of α. In this case, Proposition 3.1 states that, if the MFG equilibrium pu, mq is efficient, then, for any pt, xq P rt 0 , T sˆT d ,
The following statement is a kind of converse.
Assume that H is of separate form (i.e., (3.18) holds) and that, for any px, mq P T dˆP pT d q,
Then, the MFG system is globally efficient: for any initial condition pt 0 , m 0 q P r0, T sˆPpT d q, there exists a solution pu, mq to the MFG system (3.19) such that Cpu, mq " C˚.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that m 0 has a smooth and positive density. Otherwise we can proceed by approximation. Let pm,αq be the minimum of (3.15) andû be such that pû,mq solves (2.11) (recall Lemma 2.2). By assumption (3.20) and the structure condition (3.18), pû,mq solves
As, by Lemma 2.1,
we see that upt, xq "ûpt, xq`´T d Gpy, mpT qqmpdyq solves the MFG system (3.19) . Moreover, by the definition of u,û andm, Cpu,mq " Cpû,mq " C˚.
Let us now point out an equivalent form of (3.20):
Proposition 3.3. The map F satisfies (3.20) if and only if there exists a C 2 function F :
In this case, one can take F "F, whereF is given bŷ
Proof. If (3.20) holds, then it is obvious by (2.10) that F is of the form (3.21) with F "F . Conversely, if F is of the form (3.21), then
We can then conclude that
by Convention (2.4).
To summarize, we have obtained the following characterization of global efficiency:
Assume that H is of separate form (i.e., (3.18) holds). Then the MFG system is globally efficient if and only if
which is also equivalent to the existence of C 2 maps F :
Proof of Theorem 5.1. As the equation for m is uniformly parabolic, for ε ą 0 there exists a constant C ε such that m has a C 2 density which is bounded below by C´1 ε on rt 0`ε {2, T s. With a given pµ, βq smooth solution to
with β " µ " 0 on rt 0 , t 0`ε {2s, we set τ ε :" 1{p2C ε }µ} 8 q and, for h P r0, τ ε s, pm h , α h q :" pm`hµ, pmα˚`hβq{pm`hµqq where α˚pt, xq :"´D p Hpx, Dupt, xq, mptqq. Note that the pair pm h , α h q satisfies m h ptq P PpT d q for any t and the constraint (3.16) for any h P r0, τ ε s (in particular m h pt 0 q " m 0 because µpt 0 q " 0). Moreover, h Ñ pm h , α h q is smooth because µ " 0 on rt 0 , t 0`ε {2s and m is bounded below by a positive constant on rε{2, T s.
Next we define the map φ : r0, τ ε s Ñ R by
Gpx, m h pT qqm h pT, xqdx.
We have
Recalling the definition of α˚and the fact that where we used the equation satisfied by the pair pµ, βq and the fact that upT,¨q " Gp¨, mpTfor the last equality. Let us also note for later use that Recall that, for any h P r0, τ ε s, the pair pm h , α h q satisfies m h ptq P PpT d q for all t P rt 0 , T s and the constraint (3.16). Therefore φphq ě C˚@h P r0, τ ε s.
As
we obtain,
We now apply the above computations to two particular cases, one to get the lower bound involving F and the other one for the lower bound involving G. For ε P p0, pT´t 0 q{2q, let us set:
µpt, yq :"´γptqmpt, yqˆT 
By Convention (2.4), we have´T d µpt, yqdy " 0, so that we can find a continuous map β " βpt, xq such that (4.23) holds. Note that µ is uniformly bounded by a constant C 1 in L 8 independently of ε and therefore we can choose τ ε " 1{pC 0 C 1 q. Let us define φ as above. Then φ is of class C 1,1 with }φ 2 } 8 ď C 2 , where C 2 depends only on ε and on the regularity of H and F and C 0 . By (4.24) and the definition of µ in (4.27) we have
Thus, applying (4.26) with h " mintτ ε ,´φ 1 p0q{}φ 2 } 8 u, we obtain our first lower bound:
for some constant C ε depending on the data, on m 0 and on ε.
In order to obtain the lower bound involving G, we choose µpt, yq :"´γptqmpT, yqˆT d δG δm px, mpT q, yqmpT, xqdx, (4.28) where γptq :" " 0 if t P rt 0 , T´εs pt´pT´εqq{ε if t P rT´ε, T s where ε P p0, T {2q is small. Note that we can choose the lower bound C ε such that m ě C´1 ε on rT {2, T s independent of ε. Hence the constant τ ε :" 1{p2C ε }µ} 8 q does not depend on ε either, and we call it τ 0 .
As before we can find a continuous map β " βpt, xq such that (4.23) holds. As }γ 1 } 8 ď T {ε, we have }β} 8 ď C{ε where C depends on the regularity of G only. Moreover µ is bounded in L 8 and, therefore, }α h } 8 ď C{ε.
Let φ be associated to pµ, βq as above. Then, by (4.25) and our growth assumptions (2.6), (2.7), we have }φ 2 } 8 ď C{ε 2 . On the other hand, from the choice of µ and (4.24), We now use (4.26) to obtain Cpu, mq´C˚ě pκ´Cεqh´C 2ε 2 h 2 @h P r0, τ 0 s.
Choosing ε " cκ (for some constant c ą 0 small enough) and h " mintτ 0 , C´1κ 3 u (for some large constant C with the same dependence as above), we get our second lower bound:
Putting together our two lower bounds on C´C˚, we finally obtain Inequality (4.22).
Upper bounds on C´C˚.
In order to obtain an upper bound for C´C˚, we come back to the case where H is separated, i.e., satisfies (3.18) . Let us recall that, in this case, the MFG system becomes (3.19) . Recall the notationF
andmptq are probability measures, we have We are now in position to compare Cpu, mq and C˚:
Cpu, mq " C˚`ˆT
Examples
Throughout this part, we assume to fix the ideas that H " H 0 px, pq´F px, mq is separated (i.e., satisfies (3.18) ). To simplify the expressions, we also suppose that t 0 " 0 and G " 0. Let us recall that condition (3.20) characterizes the fact that the MFG system is globally efficient: for any initial distribution m 0 , there exists an efficient MFG equilibrium, i.e., a solution pu, mq to (3.14) such that Cpu, mq " C˚. Our first example shows that there are MFG systems which are globally efficient. However, the other examples show that this is seldom case for many standard classes of coupling functions. Integrating against m and using Convention (2.4), this implies that
which is affine in m. For instance, let φ : T dˆTd Ñ R be a non vanishing map and set F as 
